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11 Introduction
Are expectations about future macroeconomic conditions related to housing market dynamics?
Macroeconomic models of the housing market mainly rely on fundamental developments in the
economy to explain ￿ uctuations in house prices and residential investment. Among others, Davis
and Heathcote (2005) develop a multi-sector model of the housing market that matches the co-
movement of residential investment with GDP and other components of GDP by assuming tech-
nology shocks as the only source of ￿ uctuations; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) add real, nominal, and
￿nancial frictions, along with a larger set of shocks, to the multi-sector framework and highlight
the role of housing preference shock, technology and monetary factors.1
Survey evidence shows that house prices dynamics are signi￿cantly related to expectations and
particularly to optimism about future house prices appreciation. For instance, Case and Shiller
(2003) document that expectations of future house price increases had a role in past housing booms
in the U.S.; Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers to
show that during the boom that peaked in the mid-2000￿ s, expectations of rising house prices
signi￿cantly increased. Few authors have also studied the transmission mechanism of expectations
on future fundamentals to house prices in macro models. Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010)
show that changes in expectations of future macroeconomic developments can generate empirically
plausible boom-bust cycles in the housing market; Tomura (2010) documents that uncertainty about
the duration of a period of temporary high income growth can generate housing booms in an open
economy model; Adam, Kuang and Marcet (2011) explain the joint dynamics of house prices and
the current account over the years 2001-2008 by relying on a model of "internally rational" agents
that form beliefs about how house prices relate to economic fundamentals; Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011) document that heterogeneous beliefs about long-run fundamentals can lead to
booms and busts in the housing market.
The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of expectations-driven cycles for housing market
￿ uctuations. Relying on the results of Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010), we introduce news
shocks in the multi-sector model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) that
features collateralized household debt and credit frictions ￿ la Kyiotaki and Moore (1997). Their
framework is particularly relevant to the purpose of this paper since its rich modelling structure
allows for the quantifying of important alternative sources of optimism generated in di⁄erent sectors
of the economy, e.g., the housing market, the production sector, in￿ ationary factors and the conduct
of monetary policy. News shocks related to these sectors of the economy could potentially be
1See, also, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004), Finocchiaro and Queijo von Heideken (2009), Iacoviello (2005),
Kyiotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2010), Liu, Tao and Wang (2011), Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007), Rios-Rull
and Sanchez Marcos (2006), Silos (2007).
2relevant sources of housing market ￿ uctuations since, unlike most unanticipated shocks, they can
generate the co-movement observed in the data during periods of boom-bust cycles in house prices.
Thus, we allow for news shocks over di⁄erent time horizons and estimate the model using U.S. data
and Bayesian methods.
This paper provides several insightful results. First, the model that allows for news shocks is
strongly preferred in terms of overall goodness of ￿t. In particular, the data favor the inclusion
of news shocks over a longer time-horizon. Further, expected macroeconomic developments are
found to be an important source of ￿ uctuations in house prices and other macroeconomic variables.
News shocks explain around 40 percent of business cycle ￿ uctuations in house prices and a sizable
fraction of variations in consumption, residential and non-residential investment. Expectations
about future cost-push shocks are the largest contributors to business cycle ￿ uctuations. Among
other news shocks, news related to productivity explain almost one-quarter of the variability in
business investment. News shocks related to monetary factors account for a larger fraction of
variations in house prices and consumption than expectations about future productivity shocks.
Second, news shocks contribute to the boom-phases in house prices, whereas the busts are almost
entirely the result of unanticipated monetary policy and productivity shocks. Expectations of cost-
push shocks are found to be important for the run up in house prices and residential investment
during the boom of the late 1970￿ s. Investment speci￿c news shocks are the main contributor
to residential investment growth during the cycle of the late 1990￿ s. Expectations of housing
productivity shocks and investment speci￿c shocks somewhat contribute to changes in house prices
during the latest boom, whereas expected downward cost pressures on in￿ ation muted its increase
over the same period.
Last, exploring the linkage between news shocks and expectations, we ￿nd that the model is
successful in matching the dynamics of the survey-based in￿ ation and interest rate expectations and
the co-movement of these expectations with house prices. Under the assumption of debt contracts
in nominal terms, changes in the expected real rates a⁄ect households borrowing and investment
decisions. Thus, the model suggests an important role of in￿ ation or interest rates expectations
for movements in house prices. First, we show that news shocks account for a large fraction of
variation in the model-generated expectations: in￿ ation expectations are mainly related to news
on the cost-push shock, while a large part of variations in interest rate expectations is explained
by news on the shock to the target of the central bank and on the investment-speci￿c shock. The
importance of the latter shock is mainly related to the GDP growth component of the interest-
rate rule followed by the monetary authority. Then, using survey-based expectations on in￿ ation
and interest rates, we test the plausibility of the expectation channel featured by the model. On
the base of Granger causality tests we ￿nd that news shocks also contain statistically signi￿cant
3information for survey-based in￿ ation and interest rate expectations. As a result, the model mimics
particularly well the evidence that higher in￿ ation expectations are strongly related to house prices
during the boom of the 1970￿ s whereas lower interest rate expectations are signi￿cantly related to
the run up in house prices during the latest boom. The link between interest rate expectations and
house prices over the last decade seems to be mainly driven by the systematic component of the
policy rule, and, in particular, on expectations about GDP growth as opposed to news on monetary
policy shocks.
Our results support the idea that expectations about future macroeconomic developments a⁄ect
economic choices and, in particular, housing and credit decisions. Piazzesi and Schneider (2010)
input survey-based expectations into an endowment model economy with nominal credit and hous-
ing collateral and show that heterogeneous in￿ ation expectations induce disagreement about the
real rate and thus, turn out to account for the increase in credit volumes and the portfolio shift
towards real estate during the Great In￿ ation of the 1970￿ s. Our general equilibrium analysis ab-
stracts from heterogeneity in expectations. However, since the dynamics of the model are mainly
driven by the borrowers, we can conjecture that allowing for heterogenous expectations would not
change our results. In fact, if, as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2010), the borrowers are the ones who
have higher in￿ ation expectations, then they will also perceive a lower real interest rate than the
lenders, and, thus, prefer to increase their demand for external funds as well as housing investment.
In contrast, the lenders, expecting higher real interest rates, would be willing to lend more. Thus,
disagreement about the real interest rate could potentially stimulate credit ￿ ows and exacerbate
housing dynamics even further.
This paper is closely related to the empirical literature that explores the role of news shocks over
the business cycle. Among others, Beaudry and Portier (2006) show that business cycle ￿ uctuations
in the data are primarily driven by changes in agents￿expectations about future technological
growth; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010), using a real business cycle model, document that news
on future neutral productivity shocks, investment-speci￿c shocks, and government spending shocks
account for more than two thirds of predicted aggregate ￿ uctuations in postwar U.S. data; Milani
and Treadwell (2009) ￿nd that, in a new Keynesian framework, news shocks about the policy rate
play a larger role in the business cycle than unanticipated monetary policy shocks.2 We contribute
to this strand of the business cycle literature by documenting the role of news shocks in housing
market ￿ uctuations and exploring the linkage between news shocks and agents￿expectations on
in￿ ation and interest rates. To the best of our knowledge, very few papers analyze the ability of
DSGE models to match the dynamics of expectations. These other studies mainly focus on how
2See also Barsky and Sims (2009), Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani (2011), Khan and Tsoukalas (2009), Badarinza
and Margaritov (2011) and Kurmann and Otrok (2010).
4alternative assumptions regarding agents￿information about the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target help
to match in￿ ation expectations.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes
the estimation methodology. Section 4 comments on the results of news shocks as a source of
￿ uctuations in the housing market and Section 5 relate agents￿expectations to house prices. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
We rely on the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The model
features real, nominal, and ￿nancial frictions, as well as a large set of shocks. Three sectors of
production are assumed: a non-durable goods sector, a non-residential investment sector, and a
residential sector. Households di⁄er in terms of their discount factor and gain utility from non-
durable consumption, leisure, and housing services. In addition, housing can be used as collateral
for loans. For completeness, we describe the main features of the model in the next subsections.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of two types: patient and impatient.
Impatient households discount the future at a higher rate than patient households. Thus, in
equilibrium, impatient households are net borrowers while patient households are net lenders. We,
henceforth, interchangeably refer to patient and impatient households as Lenders and Borrowers,
respectively. Discount factor heterogeneity generates credit ￿ ows between agents. This feature was
originally introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended to a model of
the housing market by Iacoviello (2005). Both types of households consume, work in two sectors,
namely in the non-durable goods sector and the housing sector, and accumulate housing.

















3In particular, Schorfheide (2005) estimates on U.S. data two versions of a DSGE, featuring either full information
or learning regarding the target in￿ ation rate, and shows that, during the period 1982-1985, in￿ ation expectations
calculated from the learning model track the survey forecasts more accurately than the full-information forecasts; Del
Negro and Eusepi (2010) using in￿ ation expectations as an observable show that when agents have perfect information
about the value of the policymaker￿ s in￿ ation target model helps to better ￿t the dynamics of in￿ ation expectations.
5where ￿ is the discount factor (0 < ￿0 < ￿ < 1), " is the external habits parameter (0 < " < 1), ￿
is the inverse of the elasticity of work e⁄ort with respect to the real wage (￿ > 0), and ￿ de￿nes the
degree of substitution between hours worked in the two sectors (￿ ￿ 0). GC is the trend growth
rate of real consumption and ￿c is a scaling factor of the marginal utility of consumption. zt, jt
and ￿t are shocks to the intertemporal preferences, housing demand and labor supply that follow
AR(1) processes. Lenders decide how much to consume, ct, the amount of hours devoted to work in
each sector, nc;t and nh;t, the accumulation of housing ht (priced at qt), the supply of intermediate
inputs kb;t (priced at pb;t), the stock of land lt (that is priced at pl;t), and the stock of capital used in
the two sectors of production, kc;t and kh;t. Lenders also choose the capital utilization rate in each
sector, zc;t and zh;t (subject to a convex cost a(￿)). Finally, they decide on the amount of lending,
bt. Loans yield a riskless (gross) nominal interest rate denoted by Rt. On the other hand, Lenders
receive wage income (wc;t and wh;t are the real wages in each sector, relative to the consumption
good price), income from renting capital (at the real rental rates Rc;t and Rh;t) and land (at the
real rental rate Rl;t), and from supplying intermediate goods to ￿rms. Capital in the non-durable
goods sector and in the housing sector as well as land depreciate at (quarterly) rates ￿kc, ￿kh and
￿h. Finally, Lenders receive (lump-sum) dividends from owning ￿rms and from labor unions (Dt).

























where ￿t is the (quarter-on-quarter) in￿ ation rate in the consumption goods sector. Ak;t is an
investment-speci￿c technology shock that represents the marginal cost of producing consumption
good sector speci￿c capital.4 GIKc and GIKhare the trend growth rates of capital used in the two
sectors of production and ￿c;t and ￿h;t are convex adjustment costs for capital.5
Both types of households supply labor to unions in the two sectors of production. The unions















kh;t￿1 is the housing-sector capital adjustment cost; ￿AK represents the long-run net growth
rate of technology in business capital, ￿kc and ￿kh are the coe¢ cients for adjustment cost (i.e., the relative prices of
installing the existing capital) for capital used in the consumption sector and housing sector, respectively.
6di⁄erentiate labor services and sell it in a monopolistic competitive labor market. Thus, there is
a wedge between the wage paid by ￿rms to labor unions and those received by households (Xwc;t
and Xwh;t denote the markups in the non-durable and housing sectors, respectively). Wages are
set according to a Calvo (1983) scheme (with a 1 ￿ ￿w;c exogenous probability of re-optimization
when labor is supplied to the non-durable goods sector union and a 1 ￿ ￿w;h is the probability in
the housing sector) with partial indexation to past in￿ ation (with parameters ￿w;c and ￿w;h in the
corresponding sectors).
Borrowers Borrowers￿and Lenders￿utility function are similarly de￿ned.6 Borrowers do not
own capital, land or ￿rms. They only receive dividends from labor unions. Hence, the borrowers







































Borrowers are constrained in that they may only borrow up to a fraction of the expected present











where m ￿ 1 represents the loan-to-value ratio.7
2.2 Firms
Non-durable goods, business capital and housing are produced by a continuum of wholesale ￿rms
that act under perfect competition. Price rigidities are introduced in the non-durable sector, while
retail sale prices of housing are assumed to be ￿ exible.
Wholesale ￿rms Wholesale ￿rms operate in a perfect competition ￿ exible price market and
produce both non-durable goods, Yt, and new houses, IHt. To produce non-durable goods the
wholesale ￿rms use labor (supplied by both types of households) and capital as inputs of production
while the producers of new houses also use intermediate goods and land. Production technologies
6Variables and parameters with a prime (
0 ) refer to Borrowers while those without a prime refer to Lenders.
7Given the assumed di⁄erence in the discount factor, the borrowing restriction holds with equality in the steady
state. As common in the literature, we solve the model assuming that the constraint is also binding in a neighbourhood
of the steady state. See, among others, Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Minetti
(2006), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Sterk (2010).

























where ￿ is a parameter that measures the labor income share of Lenders and Ah;t and Ac;t are
the productivity shocks to the non-durable goods sector and housing sector, respectively. The
productivity shocks are de￿ned as:8
ln(Ax;t) = tln(1 + ￿Ax) + ln(Zx;t); x = c;h
where ln(Zc;t) and ln(Zh;t) follow AR(1) processes (with serially uncorrelated, zero mean innovations
with standard-deviations ￿Ac and ￿Ah) and ￿Ac and ￿Ah are the long-run net growth rates of
technology in each sector, such that:
ln(Zz;t) = ￿Az ln(Zz;t￿1) + uz;t:
Retailers Wholesale ￿rms in the non-durable goods sector sell their output under perfect com-
petition to retailers that act under monopolistic competition when selling the goods to households.
Retailers di⁄erentiate the non-durable goods and then sell them to households, charging a markup,
Xt, over the wholesale price. Retailers set their prices under a Calvo-type mechanism (the exo-
genous probability of re-optimization is equal to 1 ￿ ￿￿) with partial indexation to past in￿ ation
(driven by parameter ￿￿). This setup leads to the following forward-looking Phillips curve:






￿￿ and up;t is an i.i.d. cost-push shock.
8The investment-speci￿c technology shock, Ak;t, is similarly de￿ned.
82.3 Monetary Policy Authority














where rr is the steady-state real interest rate, GDP is the economy￿ s gross domestic product, uR;t
is an i.i.d. shock and As;t is a persistent shock to the central bank￿ s in￿ ation target.
2.4 News Shocks
In the model there are seven AR(1) shocks ￿zt, jt, ￿t, Ah;t, Ac;t, Ak;t and As;t ￿and two i.i.d.
shocks: up;t and uR;t. Expectations of future macroeconomic developments are introduced as in the
existing news shock literature. We assume that the error term of the shocks, with the exception of
preferences ,ux;t, consists of an unanticipated component, "0
x;t; and anticipated changes n quarters
in advance, "n





where "x;t is i.i.d and x = fc;h;k;p;R;sg. Thus, at time t ￿ n agents receive a signal about future
macroeconomic conditions at time t: As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) we assume anticip-
ated changes four and eight quarters ahead. This assumption allows for revisions in expectations,
e.g., "8









x;t￿8) and ux;t = 0).
3 Estimation
In this section, we describe both the estimation methodology and the data used. We brie￿ y comment
on the estimation results. Last, we evaluate the model both in terms of overall goodness of ￿t and
in matching data moments.
3.1 Methodology
The set of structural parameters of the model describing technology, adjustment costs, price and
wage rigidities, the monetary policy rule, and the shocks is estimated using Bayesian techniques.
We proceed in two steps. First, we obtain the mode of the posterior distribution which summarizes
9information about the likelihood of the data and the priors on the parameters￿distributions by
numerically maximizing the log of the posterior. We then approximate the inverse of the Hes-
sian matrix evaluated at the mode. We subsequently use the random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to simulate the posterior, where the covariance matrix of the proposal distribution is
proportional to the inverse Hessian at the posterior mode computed in the ￿rst step. After check-
ing for convergence, we perform statistical inference on the model￿ s parameters or functions of
the parameters, such as second moments.9 For recent surveys of Bayesian methods, see An and
Schorfheide (2007) and FernandØz-Villaverde (2010).
In setting the parameters￿prior distributions, we follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In particular,
we use a beta distribution for the serial correlations of the shocks, ￿Ax, and an inverse gamma
distribution for the standard deviations of the shocks, ￿x. In order to avoid over-weighting a
priori the anticipated component of the shocks, we assume that the variance of the unanticipated













Introducing news shocks to the model adds 12 additional parameters. In order to make the
estimation less cumbersome, we reduce the set of parameters by calibrating the parameters that
a⁄ect the steady state of the model. Most of these parameters are calibrated as in Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) while others are set to the mean estimated values reported in their estimates. Thus, as
in most of the estimated DSGE models, the steady state ratios are unchanged during the estimation.
As common in the literature, we also ￿x the autoregressive parameters of the in￿ ation targeting
shock.11 See Table 1.
In order to avoid concerns related to the identi￿ability of shocks and parameters in the model,
we check for local identi￿cation before the estimation. According to Iskrev (2010), a parameter ￿i
is locally weakly identi￿ed if either (1) the matrix ￿(￿) that collects the reduced-form parameters
of the solution of the model is insensitive to changes in ￿i or (2) if the e⁄ects on ￿(￿) of changing
￿i can be o⁄set by changing other parameters.12 Implementing this methodology we ￿nd that all
estimated parameters are locally identi￿ed.
9To perform inference we discard the ￿rst 10 per cent of observations. For further details on the estimation and
the convergence of the algorithm see the accompanying Estimation Appendix.
10See, i.e., Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani (2011).
11See, among others, Adolfson et al. (2007) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
12The analysis consists of evaluating the ranks of Jacobian matrices. The Jacobian matrix
@￿(￿)
@￿ must have full
column rank in order for the parameters to be identi￿able. See Iskrev (2010) for a description of the methodology.
103.2 Data
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we consider ten observables: real consumption per capita, real
private business and residential ￿xed investment per capita, quarterly in￿ ation, nominal short-term
interest rate, real house prices, hours worked per capita in the consumption-good and the housing
sectors, and the nominal wage quarterly change in the consumption and housing sector.13 Real
variables are de￿ ated by the output implicit price de￿ ator in the non-farm business sector. We also
follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in allowing for measurement error in hours and wage growth in
the housing sector. We use data from 1965Q1 to 2007Q4.14
3.3 Parameter Estimates
Tables 2 and 3 display the priors chosen for the model￿ s parameters and the standard deviations
of the shocks, as well as the posterior mean, standard deviations and the 95 percent probability
intervals. The posterior estimates of the model￿ s parameters feature a substantial degree of wage
and price stickiness, and a low degree of indexation in prices and wages in the consumption sector.
The estimated monetary policy rule features a moderate response to in￿ ation, a modest degree
of interest-rate smoothing, and a positive reaction to GDP growth. Finally, all shocks are quite
persistent and moderately volatile. News shocks display a much lower volatility than unanticipated
shocks.
We do not ￿nd sizable di⁄erences with respect to the estimates reported by Iacoviello and Neri
(2010). We ￿nd a slightly higher response to in￿ ation and GDP growth and a lower response to
the lagged interest rate in the Taylor Rule as well as higher stickiness and lower indexation in the
Phillips Curve. These di⁄erences are mainly related to revisions in the series for in￿ ation.15
3.4 Overall Goodness of Fit
In order to evaluate the importance of news shocks for the overall goodness of ￿t of the model,
we compare the estimated model presented above against two other speci￿cations: without news
shocks (ux;t = "0
x;t) and with news only at a 4 quarter horizon (ux;t = "0
x;t + "4
x;t￿4). The latter
speci￿cation helps us to assess the potential importance of signal revisions.
13For details on the series used and the data transformations see the Appendix.
14Since we are interested in understanding housing market dynamics over the average business cycle we do not
include the period of extreme macroeconomic ￿ uctuations that characterized the recent ￿nancial crisis. A version of
the model with the addition of a collateral shocks has been separately estimated. Due to the lack of data on debt
and house holding of credit constraint households, we ￿nd it di¢ cult to identify such a shock and thus capture the
dynamics of the recent credit crunch.
15Iacoviello and Neri (2010) used data from 1965Q1 to 2006Q4. Therefore, we use a di⁄erent vintage of the data
set.
11Table 4 reports the log marginal data density of each model, the di⁄erence with respect to the
log marginal data density of the model without news shocks, and the implied Bayes factor.16 Both
versions of the model that allow for news shocks display a signi￿cantly higher log data density
compared to the no-news model. Accordingly, the Bayes factor indicates decisive evidence in favor
of the models with news shocks, see Je⁄reys (1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995). In order for the
model without news to be preferred, we would need a priori probability over this model 1:7 ￿ 1025
larger than the prior belief about the model with 4 and 8-quarter ahead news.17 Thus, we conclude
that the data strongly favor the inclusion of news shocks. Moreover, the model that also includes
longer horizon signals outperforms all other speci￿cations in terms of overall goodness of ￿t.
All versions of the model are estimated using our updated data set. See Section 3.2. As a last
check, in the last three rows of the table 4 we report the Bayes factor using Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) data set. The same results hold.
3.5 Model and Data Moments
Table 5 reports a set of moments implied by the model with 4- and 8-quarter ahead news shocks as
well as the corresponding moments in the data. In particular, we report the standard deviations of
a few key variables: house prices, residential and business investment, consumption, hours worked
in the consumption and housing sector, and nominal wage growth in both sectors. We also show
the correlation of these variables with house prices. Overall, the model performs reasonably well
in capturing the main features of the data.
As for the variables￿standard deviations, those implied by the model are broadly in line with
the data for most of the observables.18 The volatility of consumption relative to GDP is somewhat
higher in the model than in the data. The model also overpredicts the volatility of hours in both
sectors. Regarding the correlations with house prices, the results are also broadly in line with the
data as the model generates co-movement of house prices with investment, consumption and hours,
and also implies a low correlation with wage growth.
4 News Shocks and Housing Market Dynamics
In this section, we quantify the role of news shocks for housing market dynamics. First, we analyze
the contribution of news shocks for selected variables over the business cycle. Then, we assess their
16Given that a priori we assign equal probability to each model, the Bayes factor equals the posterior odds ratio.
176:4 ￿ 10
12 larger than the prior belief about the model with 4-quarter ahead news shocks.
18Following Iacoviello and Neri (2009), GDP is de￿ned as the sum of consumption and investment at constant
prices GDPt = Ct +IKt +qIHt, where q is real housing prices along the balanced growth path in terms of the price
of the consumption good.
12role for the observed house prices booms and busts over the sample period.
4.1 Business Cycle Fluctuations
Are news shocks a relevant source of business cycle ￿ uctuations? Table 6 shows the contribution of
the anticipated and unanticipated components of the shocks to the unconditional variance of the
observable variables at business cycle frequencies. News shocks account for slightly less than 40 per-
cent of the variance in house prices, about 13 percent of the variance in residential investment, and
more than half of the variance of consumption, business investment, and in￿ ation. Expectations
8-quarters ahead account for most of the variations reported above. Regarding the di⁄erent types of
news shocks, news related to cost-push shocks are by far the most important source of ￿ uctuations
among the anticipated shocks. See Table 7. In particular, expectations about future cost push
shocks explain slightly less than 30 percent of the variability in house prices, more than 40 percent
of variations in consumption, business investment and in￿ ation, and have about the same import-
ance as news on productivity shocks for explaining residential investment. News shocks related to
monetary factors are mainly driven by the persistent shock to the target of the central bank and
explain a bit more of variations in house prices and consumption than news of productivity shocks.
News shocks about productivity in the three sectors explain almost one-quarter of the variability
in business investment.
Despite the relevant contribution of news shocks, the unanticipated component of the shocks
remains an important source of business cycle ￿ uctuations. As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010),
preference shocks have a considerable role in explaining house prices and investment. This result
is mainly driven by the housing preference shock, which in the model resembles a housing demand
shock. Unanticipated monetary shocks explain a bit less than 10 percent of the variability in house
prices and investment, and about 14 percent of the volatility of the other variables. Productivity
shocks explain around 30 and 10 percent of the variability in residential investment and house
prices, respectively. This result is mainly related to housing productivity shocks. Contrary to
news shocks, the unanticipated component of the cost-push shock is not among the main drivers
of ￿ uctuations.
4.1.1 Understanding News Shocks
The real business cycle literature has demonstrated the prominent role of unanticipated productivity
and investment speci￿c shocks in driving business cycles.19 In a standard representative agent
19See among others, Prescott (1986) and King and Rebelo (1999). Grenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) and
Fisher (2006) have shown that investment-speci￿c technological shocks have been often identi￿ed as one of the main
sources of business cycle ￿ uctuations. This result has been con￿rmed recently by Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti
13model, these shocks turn out to be an important source of business cycle ￿ uctuations since they
can generate the co-movement among the most relevant macroeconomic variables observed in the
data. In contrast to the standard representative agent model, in the model presented above, all
unanticipated shocks, with exception of the cost-push shock, do not generate pro-cyclical behavior
in either investment or hours worked. Figure 1 reports the e⁄ect of selected unanticipated shocks
on key macroeconomic variables in the model. News shocks in this model generate pro-cyclicality
among all relevant variables.20 See Figure 2. Thus, one plausible reason for the importance of news
shocks is related to the fact that these shocks are able to generate co-movement among a broad
set of macroeconomic variables as observed during periods of boom-bust cycles in house prices.21
News shocks are not only a sizable source of ￿ uctuations in house prices, but also explain a large
part of the variance in consumption and business investment and thus, strongly contribute to the
co-movement across these variables.22
Which unanticipated shocks loose importance once we introduce news shocks in the model?
To address this question, we compare the role of the unanticipated shocks in the estimated model
without news shocks (ux;t = "0




x;t￿8). See Table 8. In the model without news shocks, cost-push shocks are as important as
productivity and monetary policy shocks in accounting for the observed variability in house prices
and business investment. Cost-push shocks are also a main source of ￿ uctuations in consumption.
The introduction of news shocks as a source of ￿ uctuations signi￿cantly reduces the importance
of unanticipated cost-push shocks and gives a predominant role to the anticipated component of
this shock. As for residential investment, consumption and business investment we also ￿nd a less
sizable role for productivity and monetary factors. The importance of the unanticipated component
of all shocks is signi￿cantly reduced for house prices.
(2010) in an estimated New-Keynesian model. Few other authors have also highlighted the importance of preference
shocks.
20For a recent discussion of the theoretical literature on news shocks and the co-movement problem see Krusell and
McKay (2010).
21Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) document that, over the last three decades, housing prices boom-bust
cycles in the U. S. have been characterized on average by co-movement in GDP, consumption, business investment,
hours worked, real wages and housing investment.
22Housing preference shocks have been previously highlighted as an important source of co-movement between
house prices and consumption in models of collateral constraints at the household level. However, in the absence of
collateral constraints at the ￿rm level, preference shocks turn out to be not very important for business investment,
and thus, contribute little to the co-movement among house prices, consumption and business investment. See Liu,
Wang ans Zha (2011). In contrast, in the current set up news shocks are an important source of ￿ uctuations in
business investment, along with consumption and house prices.
144.2 Boom-Bust Cycles in House Prices
In this section, we quantify the contribution of di⁄erent shocks to house price growth over boom-
bust episodes. To identify the main cycles in real house prices, we use the Bry-Boschan algorithm
with a one-year minimum criterion to de￿ne a cycle phase. The peaks and troughs of the four
cycles identi￿ed with this method coincide with local maxima and minima of the real house price
series. See Figure 3. We report the results for the main two booms that peak in 1979Q4 and
2005Q4, respectively. Real residential investment displays co-movement with house prices during
the ￿rst two decades of the sample. The peaks in residential investment anticipate the peaks in
house prices only by one quarter. In contrast, during the last two decades, the cycles of residential
investment and house prices turn out to be unsynchronized. House prices generally increase since
the mid-1990￿ s to 2005Q3. In contrast, residential investment displays a di⁄erent pattern and more
closely follow the US economic cycle. Leading the NBER business activity peak by a few quarters,
the series displays a peak in 2000Q3, whereas the decline in housing investment ends in 2003Q1, a
few quarters after the through of activity. Thus, we also consider an alternative cycle for residential
investment peaking in 2000Q3, as identi￿ed by the Bry-Boschan algorithm.
Table 9 reports the contribution of the estimated shocks to house prices and residential in-
vestment growth during each boom- and bust-phase. Adding up the contribution of news and
unanticipated shocks we ￿nd that: (i) cost-push shocks display a sizable contribution to the run
up in house prices and residential investment of the late 1970￿ s; (ii) monetary and productivity
factors are found to be important for the subsequent bust; (iii) productivity accounts for more than
half of the increase in house prices and residential investment during the most recent period; (iv)
monetary factors signi￿cantly contribute to the early bust-phase of the more recent cycle in house
prices; (v) housing preference shocks signi￿cantly contribute to changes in house prices, whereas
the contribution of these shocks to changes in residential investment is not sizable.
Is there any role for news shocks during housing market booms and busts? Regarding the
relative importance of the anticipated and unanticipated component of shocks for changes in house
prices, news shocks contribute to the boom-phases, whereas the busts are almost entirely the result
of unanticipated monetary policy and productivity shocks. News shocks also sizably contributed
to changes in residential investment. See Tables 10 and 11.
News on cost-push shocks are found to be important for the run up in house prices and residen-
tial investment during the boom of the late 1970￿ s. In particular, expectations of cost-push shocks
contribute to around 30 percent of the run up in housing prices and 80 percent of residential invest-
ment growth. Unanticipated productivity and monetary shocks mainly account for the subsequent
bust. It is worth highlighting that expectations of cost-push shocks signi￿cantly contributed to
housing market dynamics during the entire 1970￿ s. Further, since the two cycles observed in that
15decade peaked during the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis, news on cost push shocks are plausibly related
to exogenous oil price shocks.23
Despite a more sizable role for the unanticipated component of productivity and monetary
policy shocks, news about productivity shocks in the housing sector and investment speci￿c news
shocks account together for about 20 percent of the increase in house prices over the latest boom.
Supporting the idea of a productivity-driven economic expansion mainly related to expectations
of a "New Economy", investment speci￿c news shocks were the main contributors to residential
investment growth during the second-half of the 1990￿ s.24 Further, investment speci￿c news shocks
together with expectations of downward cost pressures on in￿ ation account entirely for the sub-
sequent decline. The contribution of news about cost-push shocks also considerably muted the run
up in house prices over its entire boom phase.
Summarizing, expectation-driven cycles are mainly related to news regarding cost-push shocks,
shocks to productivity in the housing sector and investment-speci￿c technology shocks. In contrast,
the contribution of the unanticipated component of the shocks is mainly related to monetary factors
and productivity in the two sectors of production.
5 Interpreting News Shocks: the Role of Expectations
Results presented above show that news about future cost-push, housing productivity, and invest-
ment speci￿c shocks are important sources of housing market ￿ uctuations. Given that the e⁄ect of
news shocks mainly works through expectations, we now investigate the importance of expectations
for the transmission of news shocks to house prices. The assumption of nominal debt contracts
suggests a role for both in￿ ation and interest rates expectations. The housing pricing equation








(GC (1 ￿ ￿h))j, (1)
where ￿j uc;t+1
uc;t is the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel and
uh;t+j
uc;t+1 is the marginal rate
of substitution between housing and consumption. Agents choose housing and consumption goods
such that the sum of the current and expected marginal rate of substitution between the two goods,
discounted by ￿j uc;t+1
uc;t ; is equal to the relative price of houses. Movements in the real interest rate,
23As for the ￿rst cycle of the early 1970￿ s, news on in￿ ation and housing productivity together account for about
17 percent of the boom and 65 percent of the bust in house prices. See the accompanying Estimation Appendix for
further details.
24See, among others, Jerman and Quadrini (2003) and Shiller (2000) for detailed account on productivity growth
driven by computer technology and the use of new equipment since the mid-1990￿ s.
16i.e. the inverse of the pricing kernel, determine house price dynamics. Since debt contracts are
in nominal terms, expected in￿ ation a⁄ects the debt decisions of the households and also enters
the optimality condition for housing investment. Lower expected real rates, through either higher
expected in￿ ation rates or lower interest rates, induce households to borrow more and to increase
their housing investment, therefore contributing to an increase in house prices and credit ￿ ows.
We proceed in two steps. First, we quantify the contribution of news shocks to the model-based
expectations and test the model￿ s ability to match survey-based expectations. Second, we explore
the linkages between agents￿expectations and house prices.
5.1 Survey- versus Model-based Expectations
Are news shocks related to agents￿expectations? Table 12 reports the variance decomposition of
the model-based expectations about in￿ ation and interest rates generated over the sample period.25
In￿ ation expectations are mostly explained by the anticipated component of the cost-push shock and
the shock to the target of the central bank. In particular, news of future in￿ ationary shocks explain
around 50 percent of the variability in both 1- and 4-quarter ahead in￿ ation expectations, with a
predominant role for news shocks over longer horizon. In contrast, interest rate expectations are
also driven by news of in￿ ation targeting shocks and investment speci￿c shocks. The importance
of the anticipated components of the investment speci￿c shock is plausibly related to the GDP
component of the interest-rate rule. In fact, investment speci￿c news shocks are among the driving
forces of investment which itself represents a signi￿cant share of GDP.
As an alternative validation of the model, we assess the plausibility of the model generated
expectations by relating them to survey estimates of expected in￿ ation and interest rates.26 We
measure observed in￿ ation expectations using the 1- and 4-quarter ahead expected GDP de￿ ator
quarterly change estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). Alternatively, we also use the expected change in prices from the University of
Michigan Survey of Consumers.27 Interest rate expectations are measured by the 1- and 4-quarter
ahead expectations for the three-month Treasury bill rate provided by the SPF. We ￿nd that both
in￿ ation and interest rates expectations generated by the model are in line with the survey-based
expectations. See Figure 4.
Next, we evaluate the information content of news shocks for the observed expectations on
25Expectations on in￿ atio and interest rates are not among the observables used in the estimation.
26Previous papers that explore the ability of DSGE models to ￿t the dynamics of in￿ ation expectations focus on
alternative assumptions regarding agents￿information on the target of the central bank. See, i.e., Schorfheide (2005)
and Del Negro and Eusepi (2010).
27In the Michigan survey, the question asked is "By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average,
during the next 12 months?". We use the mean of the responses to this question.
17the base of the Granger causality test. We focus on the news shocks that are more relevant
to each type of expectations generated by the model. The results of the test show that news
shocks contain statistically signi￿cant information for all measures of observed in￿ ation and interest
rate expectations. See Tables 13 and 14.28 Thus, news shocks are found to be important in
explaining model-generated expectations about in￿ ation and interest rates. Further, they also
contain signi￿cant information for survey-based expectations.
5.2 Expectations and House Prices
Next, we explore the relationship between expectations and house prices. The link documented
above between news shocks and agents￿expectations suggests an important role for both in￿ a-
tion and interest rate expectations in house prices ￿ uctuations. Table 15 reports the correlations
between house prices and expectations over the observed boom and bust episodes. Survey based
in￿ ation expectations are strongly positively correlated with house prices during the boom-bust
cycle of the late 1970￿ s. In contrast, the correlation becomes weaker during the more recent cycle.
Observed interest rate expectations are negatively correlated with house prices during the recent
boom and positively correlated during the bust-phase. See also Figure 5. One plausible reason for
the weaker co-movement of in￿ ation expectations and house prices during the more recent boom,
could be related to the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize both in￿ ation and in￿ ation
expectations since the mid-1980￿ s. This could also explain the countercyclical behavior of interest
rate expectations during the latest house price boom. In fact, under more stable in￿ ation expecta-
tions, expected lower future real rates would be mainly related to expectations of a lower nominal
interest rate.
As for the model-based expectations, in￿ ation expectations are positively correlated with house
prices during the boom-bust episodes, whereas the relationship between interest rate expectations
and house prices varies through time and became negative during the most recent period of run
up in house prices. See Table 15. By visual inspection, we can see that the expected interest
rate declined during the early phase of the more recent boom (2000Q3-2004Q1) and the trough in
interest rate expectations anticipate the peak in house prices.
Interest rate expectations in the model are mainly driven by the systematic component of the
policy rule. In fact, interest rate expectations seem to be strongly linked to expectations regarding
both in￿ ation and GDP growth as opposed to news about monetary policy shocks. The negative
correlation between house prices and interest rate expectations during the more recent booms is
explained by a decline in model-based expectations regarding GDP growth. In fact, during the
28The number of lags included in the tests was chosen based on the Akaike information criteria. The results are
however robust to the introduction of alternative numbers of lags.
18early phase of the more recent house prices boom that coincided with the 2001 recession period,
interest rate expectations decline given a deterioration of GDP growth expectations. See Figure 6.
Summarizing, the model performs reasonably well in capturing the relationship between ex-
pectations and house prices. In particular, it is able to match the co-movement between house
prices and in￿ ation expectations during the earlier cycles in housing prices and the counter-cyclical
behavior of interest rate expectations during the more recent boom.
6 Conclusions
This paper quanti￿es the role of expectations-driven cycles for housing market ￿ uctuations in the
United States. Due to their ability to generate pro-cyclical and hump-shaped dynamics, news
shocks emerge as relevant sources of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations and explain a sizable fraction of
variation in house prices and housing investment and more than half of the variation in consumption
and business investment. Housing productivity, investment-speci￿c and cost-push news shocks, are
among the main sources of business cycle ￿ uctuations.
News shocks also signi￿cantly contribute to booms and busts in housing prices. In particular,
expectations about cost-push shocks turn out to be an important factor during the booms of the
1970￿ s while investment-speci￿c shocks are more relevant after the 1980￿ s. News shocks also turn
out to be important for in￿ ation and interest rate expectations that in the context of debt contracts
in nominal terms play a decisive role in agents decisions and thus house prices movement. Exploring
the link between news shocks and expectations, we ￿nd that the estimated model e⁄ectively captures
the relationship of house prices with higher in￿ ation expectations during the booms of the 1970￿ s,
and with lower interest rate expectations during the more recent boom.
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In the following we describe in detail the data used in the estimation:
￿ Real consumption: Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally adjusted, billions of
chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Log-transformed
and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
￿ Business Fixed Investment: Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjus-
ted, billions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population.
Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
￿ Residential Investment: Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Log-
transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
￿ Hours Worked in Consumption Sector: Total Nonfarm Payrolls less all employees in the
construction sector times Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers divided the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population. Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
￿ Hours Worked in Housing Sector: All Employees in the Construction Sector, times Average
Weekly Hours of Construction Workers divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population.
Log-transformed and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
￿ Growth in Nominal Wage in Consumption-good Sector: Average Hourly Earnings of Produc-
tion/ Nonsupervisory Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls, Total Private. Demeaned.
￿ Growth in Nominal Wage in Housing Sector: Average Hourly Earnings of Production/ Non-
supervisory Workers in the Construction Industry. Demeaned.
￿ Real House Prices: Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold includ-
ing value of lot) de￿ ated with the implicit price de￿ ator for the nonfarm business sector.
Demeaned.
￿ In￿ ation: quarter-on-quarter log di⁄erences in the implicit price de￿ ator for output in the
nonfarm business sector. Demeaned.
24￿ Nominal Short-term Interest Rate: 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market Rate),
expressed in quarterly units. Demeaned.
The data series as described above are shown in Figure A.1.
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The survey-based expectations data analysed in the paper are:
25￿ In￿ ation expectations: 1- and 4-quarter ahead expected GDP de￿ ator quarterly change estim-
ated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters (median
of responses ) or, alternatively, the expected change in prices from the University of Michigan
Survey of Consumers.29 Demeaned.
￿ Interest rate expectations: 1- and 4-quarter ahead expectations for the three-month Treas-
ury bill rate provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Demeaned.
These data are ploted in Figure 4.
29In the Michigan survey, the question asked is "By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the average,
during the next 12 months?".
26Table 1: Calibrated parameters
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Source: Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
27Table 2: Estimation results
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Stdev Mean 5% 95%
Habits " Beta 0.50 0.075 0.3263 0.2469 0.4003
"0 Beta 0.50 0.075 0.6018 0.5009 0.6991
Investment adjustment costs ￿k;c Gamma 10 10.01 14.9672 11.4618 18.3434
￿k;h Gamma 10 10.46 10.7674 6.6969 14.9466
Calvo prob. - prices ￿￿ Beta 0.667 0.05 0.8997 0.8817 0.9181
Calvo prob. - wages cons. sector ￿w;c Beta 0.667 0.05 0.8580 0.8170 0.8979
Calvo prob. - wages hous. sector ￿w;h Beta 0.667 0.05 0.9020 0.8829 0.9215
Indexation - prices ￿￿ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.0446 0.0058 0.0824
Indexation - wages cons. sector ￿w;c Beta 0.50 0.20 0.0535 0.0056 0.0982
Indexation - wages hous. sector ￿w;h Beta 0.50 0.20 0.4844 0.2442 0.7238
Cap. utilization adjustment costs ￿ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.6840 0.5111 0.8622
Taylor rule - Smoothing rR Beta 0.75 0.10 0.6552 0.5946 0.7150
Taylor rule - In￿ ation response r￿ Normal 1.50 0.10 1.5654 1.4664 1.6624
Taylor rule - Output growth response rY Normal 0.00 0.10 0.8025 0.7066 0.9018
Autoregressive parameters
Prod. consumption sector ￿AC Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9531 0.9289 0.9772
Prod. housing sector ￿AH Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9970 0.9943 0.9997
Prod. capital sector ￿AK Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9756 0.9593 0.9925
Preferences - housing ￿j Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9454 0.9230 0.9672
Preferences - labor ￿￿ Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9458 0.9213 0.9707
Preferences - intertemporal ￿z Beta 0.80 0.10 0.8061 0.6121 0.9600
28Table 3: Estimation results (cont.)
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Stdev Mean 5% 95%
Stand. deviation - unanticipated shocks
Prod. consumption sector ￿AC Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0096 0.0086 0.0106
Prod. housing sector ￿AH Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0187 0.0162 0.0211
Prod. capital sector ￿AK Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0015 0.0002 0.0036
Preferences - housing ￿j Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0606 0.0431 0.0793
Preferences - labor ￿￿ Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0589 0.0339 0.0826
Preferences - intertemporal ￿z Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0107 0.0074 0.0138
Cost push ￿p Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0016 0.0010 0.0022
Monetary policy ￿R Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0031 0.0024 0.0036
In￿ ation objective ￿s ￿ 100 Inv.Gam 0.1 1 0.0239 0.0178 0.0299
Stand. deviation - ant. shocks 4-q ahead
Prod. consumption sector ￿AC4 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010
Prod. housing sector ￿AH4 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0007 0.0002 0.0016
Prod. capital sector ￿AK4 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0006 0.0002 0.0010
Cost push ￿p4 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0008
Monetary policy ￿R4 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006
In￿ ation objective*100 ￿s4 ￿ 100 Inv.Gam 0.35 2 0.0250 0.0156 0.0344
Stand. deviation - ant. shocks: 8-q ahead
Prod. consumption sector ￿AC8 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0007 0.0002 0.0014
Prod. housing sector ￿AH8 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0040 0.0002 0.0103
Prod. capital sector ￿AK8 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0094 0.0069 0.0120
Cost push ￿p8 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0026 0.0019 0.0034
Monetary policy ￿R8 Inv.Gam 0.0035 0.02 0.0004 0.0002 0.0007
In￿ ation objective*100 ￿s8 ￿ 100 Inv.Gam 0.35 2 0.0323 0.0174 0.0474
Stand. deviation - measurement errors
Hours worked - housing ￿n;h Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.1445 0.1306 0.1587
Wages - housing ￿w;h Inv.Gam 0.001 0.01 0.0081 0.0071 0.0091
29Table 4: Model Comparison
No news News 4 News 4&8
Benchmark (1965-2007)
Log Marginal Data Density 4809.49 4838.97 4867.60
Di⁄erence - 29.48 58.11
Implied Bayes factor 1 6.4￿1012 1.7￿1025
I&N data (1965-2006)
Log Marginal Data Density 4693.44 4720.69 4743.11
Di⁄erence - 27.25 49.67
Implied Bayes factor 1 6.8￿1011 3.7￿1021
Note: Log Marginal Data Density based on the Modi￿ed Harmonic Mean Estimator.
30Table 5: Moments
House Pr. Housing Inv. Business Inv. Consumption Hours ￿Wages
Q IH IK C NC NH ￿WC ￿WH
Standard-deviation (relative to GDP)
Data 0.906 4.518 2.097 0.541 0.624 1.792 0.111 0.209
Mean 0.801 3.387 1.695 0.757 1.212 3.668 0.257 0.171
5% 0.684 3.519 1.915 0.703 1.104 3.557 0.259 0.179
95% 0.971 3.644 1.586 0.770 1.325 4.169 0.227 0.174
Correlation with house prices (Q)
Data 1 0.467 0.493 0.456 0.599 0.684 0.161 0.163
Mean 1 0.519 0.587 0.690 0.658 0.614 0.250 0.312
5% 1 0.303 0.590 0.754 0.670 0.410 0.236 0.218
95% 1 0.662 0.527 0.623 0.607 0.740 0.265 0.363
HP ￿ltered series.
Table 6: VarianceDecomposition: Anticipated vs Unanticipated
Anticipated Unanticipated
Total 4 -quarter 8-quarter Total
House Prices (Q) 36.62 1.20 35.42 63.38
Housing Inv. (IH) 12.59 0.52 12.07 87.43
Consumption (C) 54.84 1.65 53.19 45.16
Business Inv. (IK) 72.11 1.77 70.34 27.89
In￿ ation (￿) 63.36 10.62 52.74 36.63
Parameters set at the posterior mean; HP ￿ltered series.
31Table 7: Variance Decomposition
Anticipated Unanticipated
Production Cost Push Mon.Pol. Product. Cost Push Mon.Pol. Preferences
AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+￿
House Prices (Q) 3.62 28.52 4.48 10.42 0.70 9.27 42.99
Housing Inv. (IH) 5.18 5.29 2.12 33.43 0.15 9.51 44.34
Consumption (C) 4.22 44.65 5.97 3.41 0.76 13.95 27.04
Business Inv. (IK) 23.91 44.53 3.67 2.10 0.99 14.57 10.23
In￿ ation (￿) 1.33 45.19 16.84 2.19 10.09 13.61 10.74
Parameters set at the posterior mean; HP ￿ltered series.
Table 8: Variance decomposition: News vs No-News
Unanticipated Shocks
Prod. Cost Push Mon. Pol. Prefer. Prod. Cost Push Mon.Pol. Prefer.
AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+￿ AC+AH+AK UP UR+AS j+z+￿
House Prices (Q) 13.84 14.16 14.70 57.30 10.42 0.70 9.27 42.99
Housing Inv. (IH) 48.89 2.19 8.63 40.30 33.43 0.15 9.51 44.34
Consumption (C) 7.89 30.43 33.70 27.97 3.41 0.76 13.95 27.04
Business Inv. (IK) 23.90 29.77 37.06 9.27 2.10 0.99 14.57 10.23
In￿ ation (￿) 1.23 81.72 10.74 6.31 2.19 10.09 13.61 10.74
Left panel: contribution of unanticipated shocks, No News Model; Right Panel: contribution of unanticipated
shocks, Model with News; Parameters set at the posterior mean; HP ￿ltered series.
32Table 9: Shocks Contribution to Booms and Busts
Booms and Busts Productivity Cost Push Mon. Pol. H. Pref.
dated based on Q % change AH+AC+AK UP UR+AS j
House prices (Q)
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 17.44 1.21 5.50 -1.03 14.81
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 -16.61 -8.62 10.82 -4.61 -11.79
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 20.53 14.09 -14.22 3.38 8.58
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 -8.72 -0.49 0.66 -3.18 -6.23
Res. investment (IH)
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 20.51 14.22 17.38 -3.37 2.23
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 -3.77 -1.49 18.60 -13.73 -1.14
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 25.29 28.84 -33.74 9.33 0.81
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 6.79 7.18 5.06 -8.55 0.61
dated based on IH
Res. investment (IH)
1992 Q1 - 2000 Q3 48.86 38.72 -11.81 4.03 -0.88
2000 Q4-2003 Q1 -25.65 -13.57 -10.84 -1.90 -0.20
2003 Q2-2007 Q4 12.81 11.70 -7.31 2.61 1.97















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 12: Model-based expectations: variance decomposition
Anticipated shocks Unanticipated
Total Cost Push (UP) Inf. Target (AS) Inv. Speci￿c (AK) shocks
4-quarter 8-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter Total
In￿ ation exp.
1 quarter ahead 72.19 1.64 49.27 10.21 9.13 27.78
4 quarter ahead 78.97 0.86 53.20 11.26 12.10 21.01
Int. rate exp.
1 quarter ahead 72.04 0.11 14.63 14.90 15.33 0.06 22.23 27.95
4 quarter ahead 80.38 0.05 7.42 18.78 27.14 0.01 23.62 19.65
Parameters set at the posterior mean.
36Table 13: Granger causality tests - In￿ ation expectations
SPF Michigan Survey
1 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
Cost-push (UP)
4 quarter ahead 6.8299 [0.0000] *** 3.2492 [0.0417] ** 15.743 [0.0000] ***
8 quarter ahead 14.570 [0.0000] *** 11.8680 [0.0000] *** 31.954 [0.0000] ***
The null hypothesis is that the shock does not Granger cause in￿ ation expectations.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi￿cance.
Table 14: Granger causality tests - Interest rate expectations (SPF)
1 quarter ahead 4 quarter ahead
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
Cost-push shock (UP)
4-quarter ahead 20.569 [0.0000] *** 11.603 [0.0000] **
8-quarter ahead 19.380 [0.0000] *** 8.431 [0.0000] ***
Prod. K shock (AK)
4-quarter ahead 25.476 [0.0000] *** 26.500 [0.0000] ***
8-quarter ahead 30.842 [0.0000] *** 51.915 [0.0000] ***
Inf. Target shock (AS)
4-quarter ahead 15.685 [0.0000] *** 4.451 [0.0011] ***
8-quarter ahead 17.377 [0.0000] *** 2.435 [0.0928] *
The null hypothesis is that the shock does not Granger cause interest rate.
expectations. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi￿cance.
37Table 15: Expectations and House Prices
Correlation with House Prices
Survey-based Expectations (SPF) Model-based Expectations
In￿ ation Interest Rate In￿ ation Interest Rate
1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q 1Q 4Q
Booms and Busts Cycles
1976 Q2 - 1979 Q4 0.885 0.782 0.839 0.836 0.946 0.941
1980 Q1 - 1985 Q3 0.938 0.922 0.873 0.880 0.926 0.873 0.741 0.833
1992 Q4 - 2005 Q4 -0.356 -0.482 -0.551 -0.512 0.553 -0.101 -0.513 -0.333
2006 Q1 - 2007 Q4 -0.144 0.317 0.631 0.601 0.915 0.803 0.773 0.471
Overall
1970 Q4 - 2007 Q4 0.967 0.495 0.486 0.465 0.461 0.501
1980 Q1 - 2007 Q4 0.223 0.176 0.193 0.242
1- and 4-quarter-ahead expectations.
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Figure 1: Impulse-Response Functions: Unanticipated Shocks
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Figure 2: Impulse-Response Functions: News Shocks (1 stdev shock)






Notes: Real house prices in deviations from trend. Red solid lines indicate peaks.
Figure 3: Real House Prices
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Red dashed lines indicate house prices peaks.
Figure 4: Model- vs Survey-Based Expectations



























Red dashed lines indicate house prices peaks.
Figure 5: Housing Booms and Expectations











Note: Red dashed line indicates the peak in house prices.
Figure 6: GDP Growth Model-based Expectations 1-quarter ahead
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